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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK BAMBROUGH, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Appellant, 
vs. : 
:
 Case No. 14320 
RAY BETHERS, dba 
Ray Bethers Trucking, : 
and DANNY SHIMIZU, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. : 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff for damages a r i s ing out 
of personal injury incurred as a resul t of the negligent operat ion of a fork-
lift by Defendants. Defendants in their amended answer did allege as an 
affirmative defense that if the Plaintiff suffered any injuries or daniages , 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said damages or in jur ies , if any, occur red while the Plaintiff was an 
employee of the Defendant Ray Be the r s , dba Ray Be thers Trucking, p u r -
suant to the provis ions of Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended, a n d / o r the Plaintiff was in the same employment as both Defendants, 
pursuant to the provis ions of Section 35-1-62 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
a s amended, and pursuant to the provis ions of Section 35-1-60 of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended, Workmen 's Compensation is Plaintiff 's exclu-
sive remedy against the Defendants. Pursuan t to stipulation of the p a r t i e s , 
the i s sues ra i sed by this defense were t r ied before a ju ry , exclusive of any 
other i s sues of liability and damages . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was t r ied before a ju ry and the cause was submitted to 
them on a special verd ic t p repa red pursuant to the Cour t ' s d i rec t ion. The 
Court , upon receiving the J u r y ' s answer to each proposi t ion set forth in the 
special verd ic t , did enter a Judgment of D i smis sa l on September 25, 1975, 
(R-6 ,7) . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Supreme Court r e v e r s e the Judgment of D i smi s sa l dated 
September 25, 1975, or, in the a l t e rna t ive , for an Order of the Supreme Court 
setting aside the Judgment of D i smis sa l and remanding the case back to the 
Dis t r i c t Court for a new t r ia l on the i ssue of Workmen 's Compensation. 
- 2 -
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 15, 1973, Plaintiff was employed a s a s emi - t ruck 
d r ive r by the D & L Corporat ion of P rovo , Utah (R-282,283). 
2. On January 15, 1973, Plaintiff, pursuant to the ins t ruct ion of 
his employer , did drive a s emi - t ruck and t r a i l e r owned by his employer to the 
business p r e m i s e s of the Defendant Ray Bethers for the purpose of picking up a 
t r a i l e r load of wail paneling to be del ivered to Denver , Colorado (R-284,285). 
3. Subsequent to the completion of the loading of the t r a i l e r to be 
del ivered by Plaintiff to Denver, Colorado, a forklift owned by the Defendant 
Ray Bethers and being operated by the Defendant Danny Shimizu, an employee 
of the Defendant Ray Bethers , did run over the Plaintiff, causing, among other 
in jur ies , the subsequent amputation of his left leg (R-292,293). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBIT 1-D, 
A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "TRIP LEASE", DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 1972, 
EXHIBIT 8-D, A DRIVER1 S DAILY LOG, DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 1972, AND 
EXHIBIT 9-D, A DRIVER'S DAILY LOG DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1972. 
The t r ia l court e r r e d by receiving into evidence for any purpose 
Exhibit 1-D, a document entitled "Tr ip L e a s e " , and dated September 7, 1972, 
for the following r ea sons : 
- 3 -
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1. The only evidence before the Court was that Plaintiff had not 
signed the document entitled "Trip Lease'1 (R-283). Defendant Bethers does 
not claim to have personal knowledge that Plaintiff signed the MTrip Lease". 
Bethers originally testified that the Plaintiff had signed the document in his 
presence (R-266). Subsequently, on cross examination, he stated that the 
document had been signed in his office but whether it was signed in front of 
him or in front of his personnel, he did not know (R-273). Further, the 
Defendant Bethers stated in his published deposition that he had no way of 
knowing whether or not the two signatures of the Plaintiff which appear on 
Exhibit 1-D were, in fact, the signatures of Plaintiff, other than for the 
reason that the words "Clark Bambrough" had been written on the document 
(R-274). Subsequently, Plaintiff was asked on direct examination whether the 
purported signatures of Clark Bambrough appearing on Exhibit 1-D were his . 
In response thereto, he said "no", and further testified that he had not seen 
the document prior to the taking of the deposition of Defendant Bethers (R-283). 
2. The document, Exhibit l -D, is irrelevant and immaterial to 
the events occurring and the relationship of the parties on the date of the injury, 
January 15, 1973, but rather dealt with a completely different transaction some 
four months prior in time, the date of September 7 and 8, 1972, (R-269,280). 
The trial court erred by receiving into evidence Exhibits 8-D and 
9-D, which purport to be Driver's Daily Logs for the 7th and 8th days of 
September, 1972, for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 immediately preceding, 
- 4 -
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that is to say they are irrelevant and immaterial to the date of January 15, 
1973, but apply only to a separate transaction occurring on the 7th and 8th 
days of September, 1972. 
The error committed by the trial court in receiving into evidence 
Exhibits 1-D, 8-D, and 9-D, constitutes prejudicial error which did, in fact, 
affect the substantial rights of the Plaintiff in that the purported trip lease 
and driver's daily logs did impress upon the jury the logical implication that 
Plaintiff was obligated to execute the same type of lease and to prepare the 
same type of logs had he not been injured on January 15, 1973, which implica-
tion is not justified by the evidence. Plaintiff did testify that he drove for his 
employer, D & L Trucking, without a trip-lease arrangement the majority of 
the time (R-299), and that he had no knowledge the trip of January 15, 1973, 
was to be under a purported trip-lease arrangement (R-286). The only testi-
mony before the trial court was that Plaintiff had been specifically instructed 
by his employer to go to Defendant Bethers' yard and pick up a trailer load of 
wood paneling and take the same to Denver, Colorado (R-284). 
POINT II -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS 2-D 
(YELLOW COPY), 3-D (WHITE COPY), AND 4-D (PINK COPY), COPIES OF 
A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "TRIP LEASE", DATED JANUARY 15, 1973. 
The trial court erred in receiving into evidence Exhibits 2-D, 3-D, 
and 4-D, said exhibits being copies of a document entitled "Trip Lease" and 
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being dated January 15, 1973. The Tr ip Lease was received without founda-
tion sufficient to demons t ra te its competency, re levancy and mate r i a l i ty a s to 
the Plaintiff. The Defendants sought to admit the Tr ip Lease into evidence as 
tending to prove their defense that the Plaintiff was at the t ime of the injury 
e i ther an f ,employeeM of the Defendant Ray Bethers or was n in the same employ-
ment" as the Defendant Danny Shimizu. The "T r ip L e a s e " does not bear the 
signature of the Plaintiff but r a the r bea r s the s ignature of another d r i ve r by 
the name of Bud Jolley. In light of the Plaintiff 's test imony that he had no 
knowledge of the purported T r i p - L e a s e a r r angemen t , that he did not on 
January 15, 1973, consent to dr ive under a T r i p - L e a s e a r r angemen t (R-286), and 
the Defendants' failure to produce any competent evidence to the con t ra ry , the 
" T r i p L e a s e " was incompetent evidence to bind the Plaintiff to the t e r m s thereof. 
The t r ia l court by receiving the Tr ip Lease into evidence did i r r e p a r a b l y p r e -
judice the Plaintiff 's case for the reason the jury when consider ing said "T r ip 
L e a s e " and the t r ia l cour t ' s r easons for admitt ing the same into evidence over 
the objections of the Plaintiff, could only imply that the Plaintiff had intended to 
be bound by the t e rms of that "Tr ip L e a s e " or one s imi la r to it on the date of 
the injury, January L5, 1973. 
POINT I I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2, NO. 3, NO. 4, NO. 5, NO. 6, NO. 7, and NO. 8. 
- 6 -
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Plaintiff requested, and the Court refused to give the following 
Ins t ruc t ions : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
An employee is one who is hired and paid a sa la ry , 
a wage, or at a fixed r a t e , to pe r fo rm the employe r ' s 
work as directed by the employer and who is subject 
to a comparat ively high degree of control in performing 
those dut ies . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The re la t ion of employer and employee, for Workmen 's 
Compensation purposes , cannot exist between the Defen-
dant Ray Bethers and a loaned employee such as the 
Plaintiff Clark Bambrough, without the following being 
p resen t : 
(a) Consent on the pa r t of Plaintiff to work for 
the Defendant Ray Be thers ; 
(b) Actual entry by the Plaintiff upon the work of 
and for the Defendant Ray Be the r s , pursuant to a contract 
so to do; 
(c) Power of the Defendant Ray Bethers to control 
the detai ls of the work to be performed and to de te rmine 
how the work shall be done and whether it shall stop or 
c ontinue. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
For Workmen's Compensation purposes , an employee 
cannot have an employer thrust upon him against his 
will or without his knowledge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
"Control" must be authori tat ive d i rec t ion and control , not 
m e r e suggestions as to deta i ls or n e c e s s a r y cooperation. 
- 7 -
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Control , or lack of control , of the employee, while 
of the g rea tes t significance, is not conclusive. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
The m e r e fact that Plaintiff 's regula r employer , 
D & L Corporat ion, pe rmi t s some division of 
control does not give r i se to the inference that he 
has su r rendered control . 
These requested ins t ruct ions deal t with the i s sue of whether or not, exclusive 
of the purported t r ip l ease , Plaintiff could be found to be a lent employee of 
the Defendant Ray Be the r s , which finding is n e c e s s a r y to conclude that the 
Plaintiff and Defendant Danny Shimizu were in the " s a m e employment" at the 
t ime of the injury. 
This Honorable Court , in the case of P e t e r s o n v. Foweler , 27 U. 2d 
159, 493 P . 2d 997 (1972), did state that the idea of " s a m e employment" was 
well known in connection with the fe l low-servant rule of law pr ior to the enact -
ment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the t e r m " same employment" 
a s used in our Workmen 's Compensation Act should be given the meaning which 
had been attached to it under the cases decided up to that t ime. The doctr ine 
of fellow servant may only be involved where the evidence shows that the injured 
par ty and the par ty causing the injury were engaged in the serv ice of the same 
employer , 53 Am. Ju r . 2d, Mas te r and Servant , Section 325, at page 344. In 
order for the Workmen's Compensation defense to apply in the instant c a s e , the 
- 8 -
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ju ry would have had to find that the Plaintiff was e i ther an employee of the 
Defendant Be thers by virtue of the wri t ten lease or that he was in the " same 
employment" a s Defendant Danny Shimizu, which finding, excluding the t r ip 
l ease , could only be on the basis that he was a "lent employee" as the same 
was defined under and as a pa r t of the fe l low-servant doct r ine . The Plaintiff-
Appellant has previously stated his posit ion that the "T r ip L e a s e " of January 15, 
1973, was incompetent, i r r e levan t and immate r i a l to him and the status of his 
employment at the time of the injury, and will make no further a rgument a s 
to that issue at this t ime. 
Under the lent-employee doc t r ine , it is a wel l -es tabl ished rule 
that an employee cannot have a special employer th rus t upon him against his 
will or without his knowledge. F i she r v. City of Seatt le, 384 P. 2d 852 (Wash. 
1963). The Court in the F i s h e r case went on to state that employment, as any 
other contract , presupposes understanding and that while understanding may 
be inferred from the c i r cums tances , understanding there mus t be. See, a l so , 
1 La r son , Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 48. 10 (1952). In further 
d iscuss ing the i ssue of consent as the same applies to the doctrine of lent 
employee, the Court , in a case dealing with implied consent , Schepp v. Mid 
City Trucking Company, 291 S. W. 2d 633, 642 (Mo. 1956), s t a tes : 
. . . The facts and c i r cums tances and ac ts and conduct of 
ai l the pa r t i e s mus t show a del iberate and informed con-
sent by the claimant to the substitution of a new tempora ry 
employe r . . . The consent mus t be voluntary. An employee 
for compensation purposes cannot have an employer thrust 
upon him against his will or without his knowledge. Stroud 
- 9 -
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v, Zuzich, Mo. Sup. , 271 S.W. 2d 549, 5 5 6 ( 2 , 3 ) . Nor 
will he be held to have lost his original employer without 
his knowledge. There mus t be a "consensua l" re la t ionship 
between the loaned employee and the special employer . 
Stroud v. Zuzich, supra . 
The Court in the Schepp case went on to set down, at page 640, 
the e lements of the test to be used to de te rmine whether or not the re la t ion 
of employer and employee exis ts between a special employer and a loaned 
employee, to wit: 
The relat ion of employer and employee exis ts between a 
special employer and a loaned employee whenever the 
following facts concur: (a) consent on the pa r t of the 
employee to work for the special employer ; (b) actual 
entry by the employee upon the work of and for the special 
m a s t e r pursuant to an e x p r e s s or implied contract to do 
so; (c) power of the special employer to control the detai ls 
of the work to be per formed and to de te rmine how the work 
shall be done and whether it shall stop or continue. 
As to the issue of control , the Court went on to say: 
The m e r e fact that the general employer p e r m i t s some 
division of control does not give r i se to the inference that 
he has su r r ende red control , Resta tement of the Law of 
Agency, Section 227, page 501. . . . An employee is not 
"lifted" out of his general employment and set down in 
the serv ice of another by the m e r e fact that such other i s 
authorized by the general m a s t e r to indicate the work to 
be done or to furnish information or give signals call ing 
the servant into act ivi ty. 
It is the posit ion of the Plaintiff-Appellant, that the i t ems of the 
test as set forth in the Schepp case , a r e not p re sen t in the instant case for 
there was no express consent by Plaintiff to enter into an employer -employee 
relat ionship with Defendant Be thers , nor were the actions of the Plaintiff 
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sufficient to imply such consent. The only competent evidence before the 
Court relevant to the issue of Plaintiff 's consent is Plaintiff 's test imony that 
he was ins t ructed by his employer , D & L Corporat ion, to go to Defendant 
Be thers ' yard and pick up a load of paneling to take to Denver (R-284). 
Plaintiff further testified that when he a r r ived at Defendant Be thers ' yard 
and received ins t ruct ions con t ra ry to those he had originally received from 
D & L Corporat ion, the Plaintiff called the D & L Corporat ion for authorizat ion 
to deviate from his original ins t ruct ions and act in compliance with the d e s i r e s 
of Defendant Bethers (R-286). Therefore , it is the contention of the Plaintiff-
Appellant that at no time was there an exp re s s consent by Plaintiff to enter 
into an employment agreement with Defendant Bethers and that his actions 
we re , in fact, consistent with his test imony that he was at ail t imes operating 
only pursuant to the instruct ions and under the authori ty of his employer , the 
D & L Corporat ion, and that his consent to become an employee of Defendant 
Bethers cannot be implied. 
Plaintiff a l so requested and the Court refused to give, Plaintiff 's 
Instruct ion No. 2, which reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Before the Defendant Ray Bethers may per form t r a n s -
portat ion in or with equipment which he does not own, 
the contract , l ease , or other a r r angemen t for the use 
of such equipment shall be: 
- 11 -
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(a) Made between the Defendant Ray Bethers and 
the owner of the equipment. 
(b) In wri t ing and signed by the Defendant Ray 
Bethers and the owner of the equipment or their regula r 
employees or agents duly authorized to act for them in 
the execution of con t r ac t s , l eases or other a r r a n g e m e n t s . 
(c) Specify the per iod for which it appl ies , which 
shall not be l e s s than thir ty (30) days when the equipment 
is to be operated for the Defendant Ray Be the r s by the 
owner or employee of the owner. 
The Court , in refusing to give the above ins t ruct ion, did commit 
prejudicial e r r o r in that said ins t ruct ion was reflective of exis t ing s ta tu tory 
authori ty and the ru les and regulations i ssued thereunder , Chapter X, 
In ters ta te Commerce Commiss ion, Subchapter A-Genera l Rules and Regulations, 
P a r t 1057.4, as authorized by 49 U. S. C. 304. Had the Court given the i n s t ruc -
tion as reques ted , the jury would have had the opportunity to compare the t e rms 
of the lease to the l imitat ions required by the ins t ruc t ion , specifically the fact 
that the "Tr ip Lease" was for a period of two days while the law as set forth 
in the ins t ruct ion required a min imum of thirty days , and the jury would not 
have had the opportunity to improper ly imply that the Plaintiff was bound by 
the t e rms of the "T r ip L e a s e " . 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, OVER PLAINTIFF 'S OBJECTIONS, IT 
SUBMITTED PROPOSITIONS 1, 2 , AND 3 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT TO 
THE JURY. 
Proposi t ion 1 of the Special Verdict as it was submitted to the 
jury s ta tes as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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PROPOSITION NO. 1 
Ray Bethers Trucking Company had the right to 
supervise and control the act ivi t ies of Clark 
Bambrough in relat ion to the loading of the t r a i l e r 
and the operation of the same at the time and place 
of the accident January 15, 1973. 
The proposit ion is mis leading and fails to d i rec t itself to the 
relevant i ssue of whether or not Plaintiff 's employer , D & L Corporat ion 
had t r ans fe r red sufficient control over the Plaintiff to Defendant Ray Bethers 
to qualify Plaintiff as an employee of Defendant Be the r s . There is no 
question that Defendant Bethers had the right to supervise the loading of 
cargo for which he was responsible and to d i rec t the operation of the t r a i l e r 
in his yard; however, the fact which is excluded from the proposi t ion is 
that Plaintiff had acted pursuant to his employer ' s instruct ions and had, in 
fact, telephoned his employer , D &: L Corporat ion for authori ty to deviate 
from his employer ' s original ins t ruct ions (R-286). 
As the Court stated in the Schepp ca se , supra: 
The m e r e fact that the general employer pe rmi t s some 
division of control does not give r i se to the inference that 
he has su r r ende red control . . .An employee is not lifted 
out of his general employment and set down in the service 
of another by the m e r e fact that such other is authorized 
by the general m a s t e r to indicate the work to be done or 
to furnish information or give signals calling the servant 
into activity. The general employer mus t r e l ease full 
and complete control . 
Proposi t ion No. 2 of the Special Verdict , as i t was submitted to 
the jury is as follows: 
- 13 -
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PROPOSITION NO. 2 
Clark Bambrough consented to and undertook to 
unload and reload the plywood cargo and consented 
to transport the same to Denver for and on behalf 
of Ray Bethers' Trucking Company. 
Proposition No. 2 as framed by the trial court is defective on 
much the same grounds as Proposition No. 1. There could be no question 
that the Plaintiff consented to and undertook to unload and reload the plywood 
cargo and intended to transport the same to Denver, but the proposition fails 
to raise the material question of whether Mfor and on behalf" as an employee 
of D & L Corporation in performance of its business and pursuant to its 
instructions or as an employee of the Defendant Ray Bethers. 
Proposition No. 3 as submitted to the jury states: 
Clark Bambrough knew, or as a reasonable truck operator 
should have known that the plywood cargo he was to trans-
port to Denver was to be loaded and transported to Denver 
for and on behalf of Ray Bethers1 Trucking Company. 
This proposition i s repetitious in that it raises the same issue 
and suffers from the same defects as Proposition 2. There can be no question 
that the Plaintiff was aware of the fact that the load he was to pick up was at 
the yard of Defendant Bethers and whatever conclusion may be drawn from the 
fact that the trailer was on Bethers1 property may be inferred. The same 
defects evident in Propositions 1 and 2 above are also evident in Proposition 3 
as the proposition as framed forces the jury to reach a conclusion which is not 
- 14 -
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disposit ive of the focal i s sue at hand. This proposit ion avoids the question 
if the Plaintiff was act ing for and on behalf of his employer the D & L Corpor -
ation, or if he now had changed his status and was working on behalf of the 
Defendant B e t h e r s . The Plaintiff-Appellant submits that given the opportunity 
the jury could have found very easi ly that while he knew the goods were being 
handled at the yard of Defendant Be the r s , his act ions were within the scope 
of his employment by the D & L Corporat ion. 
With r e spec t to Proposi t ions I, 2 and 3 , the position of the Plaintiff-
Appellant that the proposit ions were framed in such a way as to remove all 
d iscre t ion from the jury can bes t be exemplified by quoting from the record 
the s tatement of one of the j u r o r s , Miss Woodward, when in being polled by 
the Court , she responded to the Cour t ' s question: "Miss Woodward, the 
verd ic t as re turned, was that and is that your verdic t in all pa r t i cu la r s? ,! 
by answering "According to the wording of it, your Honor. H (R-331). 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully contends that the t r ia l cour t 
committed prejudicial e r r o r in (1) receiving into evidence Exhibits i -D, 2-D, 
3-D, 4-D, 8-D, and 9-D, as argued in points I and I I above; (2) failing to 
grant Plaintiff 's requested Instruct ions numbers 2, 3 , 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, as 
argued in Point I I I above; and (3) submitting to the jury Proposi t ions 1, 2, and 
3 of the Special Verdict , as argued in Point I V above. Appellant respectfully 
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urges this Honorable Court, in light of the error alleged above and the 
arguments made and authorities cited in support thereof to reverse the 
Judgment of Dismissal dated September 25, 1975, or, in the alternative, 
to enter its Order setting aside the Judgment of Dismissal and remanding 
to the District Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. PERKINS 
of TURNER & PERKINS 
Valley Professional Plaza 
2525 South Main, Suite 14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I served three copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Stephen B. 
Nebeker, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, at 400 Deseret Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this £ f t _ d a y of March, 1976. 
<2±Jui.GLL. 
R I C H A R D W. P E R K I N S 
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